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THE YEARS 1965-1980 AS EXPERIENCED IN SIX MACROECONOMIC FUNCTIONS
Abstract
Instead of offering a qualitative or a quantitative chronology
of the sixteen turbulent years 1965-1980 the paper arranges pairvjise
twelve important macroeconomic variables and draws scatter diagram
of six familiar macroeconomic behavior functions, some discovered
by Keynes or the Keynesians, others by the monetarists, but all part
of our tool kit. The paper uses no source other than the Economic
Report of the President transmitted to the Congress January 1981.
The paper simply tries to form a rough impression of how well the
six functions withstood the turbulence.

i». THE YEARS 1965-1980 AS EXPERIENCED IN SIX MACROECONOMIC FUNCTIONS
By Hans Brems
The sixteen years 1965 through 1980 began with an escalation of
a war setting off an inflation that was to accelerate from two to ten
per cent per annum over the sixteen years—subsiding in 1971-1972 under
price controls and in 1975-1976 under heavy excess capacity but refueled
in 1972-1974 by oil, food, and decontrol shocks and in 1977-1979 by
another oil shock.
The story of such turbulence could be told as a qualitative chron-
ology emphasizing policy measures adopted and discarded. Or the story
could be told as a quantitative chronology tracing important variables
as functions of time. The present paper will do neither. Instead it
will arrange pairwise the twelve variables
C = physical consumption
g^ = rate of inflation
I H physical investment
M = supply of money
P H price of goods and services
R = tax revenue
r = nominal rate of interest
p = real rate of interest
X H physical capacity
max
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X = physical output
Y = money value of output
y = money disposable income
or ratios or differences between them and draw scatter diagrams of six
macroeconcmic behavior functions discovered by Keynes, Keynesians or
monetarists but all part of our tool kit.
The paper will use no source other than the Economic Report of
the President transmitted to the Congress January 1981. The paper will
simply try to form a rough impression of how well the six functions
withstood the turbulence.
1. Inflation Tempered by Excess Capacity
Expecting inflation, firms will be compelled to contribute to it
by raising their own price. But all price policy is a compromise be-
txjeen cost considerations and demand considerations: firms will be
more reluctant to raise their own price at high excess capacity than
at low excess capacity. Inflation, in other words, is tempered by
excess capacity—but perhaps with a lag.
Price policy is part of a corporate routine requiring hearings
of accounting, marketing, production, and finance staffs. Once reached,
a decision will not be revised for some time. As a result, current-
year price change could be expected to reflect previous-year rather
than current-year excess capacity. Will it?
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Inflation and the Two Rates of Interest
United States, 1965-1980
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Figure 1 plots the rate of change of the gross-national-product
fixed-weighted price index of the current year as a function of one
minus the Wharton capacity utilization rate of the previous year. There
is a visible tendency for years having a high rate of excess capacity
to induce next year a rate of inflation lower than that induced by
years having a low rate of excess capacity. But no more than a tendency
is visible. The function comes, as it were, in three layers, i.e.,
1965-1970, 1971-1974, and 1975-1980. The two shifts may have been
caused by the first and the second oil shock, in other words by some-
thing external to the U.S. economy.
2. Inflation and the Two Rates of Interest
Figure 2 uses the corporate-bond and the common-stock yields, re-
spectively, as proxies [Brems (1980: 82-85)] for the nominal and real
rates of interest and plots their difference as a function of the rate
of change of the gross-national-product fixed-weighted price index.
If the bond and dividend yields were perfect representatives of the
nominal and real rates of interest, respectively, their difference
would always equal the rate of inflation, and all observations in a
diagram like figure 2 would lie on a 45° line. Will they?
The observations of the first five years stay very close to the
45° line, and so do the observations of 1976 and 1980. But both oil
shocks generated unprecedented rates of inflation, and the security
markets apparently considered such rates temporary. Both when the
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rates turned out to be temporary—as in 1975-1976—and when they did
not—as in 1980— the security markets eventually returned to the immedi-
ate neighborhood of the 45" line. When all is said and done, there is
a visible tendency for years having a high rate of inflation to induce
a gap between the nominal and real rate of interest which is larger
than that induced by years having a low rate of inflation,
3. Investment and the Real Rate of Interest
Physical net investment serves the purpose of expanding physical
net national product X, hence will normally be growing at the same rate
as the latter. Only if net investment were a function of something
else than X would the ratio I/X be varying. That something else could
be the cost of capital, but which cost, the nominal or the real rate
of interest? Physical investment is the acquisition of physical goods
for the purpose of producing more such goods, and the price of the
goods is growing at the rate of inflation. Consequently investment
would not be discouraged by a nominal rate of interest that was high
merely because of inflation. Only a high real rate of interest would
discourage investment—and perhaps with a lag.
Like price policy, investment policy is part of a corporate
routine requiring time-consuming staff hearings. But a price-policy
decision may at least be executed by the stroke of a pen. The execu-
tion of an investment policy decision requires more time. Digging,
construction, and delivery times will elapse before everything can be
-8-
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in place and appear as completed investment in the national income
accounts. As a result, the current-year investment-product ratio
could be expected to reflect a previous-year rather than a current-
year real rate of interest. Will it?
Figure 3 plots the current-year ratio between net private
domestic investment and net national product as a function of the
previous-year common stock yield. Figure 3 shows a visible tendency
for years having a high real rate of interest to induce next year an
investment-product ratio lower than that induced by years having a
low real rate of interest. But no more than a tendency is visible.
The first thirteen years 1965-1977 cluster along a distinct beam,
but the last three years 1978-1980 veer off the beam and display a
higher investment-product ratio than one would have expected from
real rates of interest as high as between five and six percent.
4. A Consumption Function
Figure 4 is our venerable consumption function. Personal consump-
tion expenditures in billions of 1972 dollars are plotted as a function
of disposable personal income, also in billions of 1972 dollars. There
is the familiar tendency for years having high disposable personal in-
come to induce a personal consumption expenditure higher than that in-
duced by years having low disposable personal income. As usual, but
with the one exception of the first oil shock 1973-1974, consumption
and income are both monotonically rising.
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After the 1973-197A oil shock the consumption was never the same.
Before the shock its slope was well below 0.90. After the shock the
slope is much higher. Clearly consumers have met accelerated inflation
by saving less.
5. A Tax-Revenue Function
Government gross receipts are defined as personal tax and nontax
payments plus corporate profits tax liability plus indirect business
tax and nontax liability plus contributions for social insurance.
From government gross receipts subtract the part of it paid back to
the private economy in the form of transfer payments, subsidies, and
interest on government debt and arrive at government net receipts.
The part paid back to the private economy is a compensation for no
goods or services produced, hence is part of neither net national
product nor national income but is part of disposable personal income.
Disposal personal income equals net national product minus undistri-
buted corporate profits after tax minus government gross receipts
plus transfer payments, subsidies, and interest on government debt.
Or, ignoring what the government collects with one hand only to pay
back with the other, disposable personal income simply equals net
national product minus undistributed corporate profits after tax
minus government net receipts.
May we ignore what the government collects with one hand only
to pay back with the other? We may if our focus is the dichotomy
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of government versus private. We may not if our focus is income
redistribution or the incentive effects of transfer payments and
taxes. The people from whom the goverment collects with one hand
are not the same as those to whom the government pays back with the
other.
Figure 5 plots government net receipts as a function of net
national product. There is a clear tendency for years having a high
net national product to generate government net receipts higher than
those generated by years having a low net national product. With
the one exception of the first oil shock 1974-1975, net receipts
and net product are both monotonically rising.
6. Velocity of Money and the Nominal Rate of Interest
Money M serves the purpose of tranacting the money value Y of
the net national product, hence will normally be growing at the
same rate as the latter. Only if the demand for money were a func-
tion of something else than Y would the ratio Y/M be varying. What
does that ratio represent?
The money value Y of net national product is measured in dollars
per annum, but the money supply M is measured in dollars. Dividing
the former by the latter yields a flow-stock ratio having the dimen-
sion pure number per annum. That is nothing but the number of times
per annum that money transacts product, i.e., the velocity of money.
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What could that something else than Y be of which the demand
for money were a function? It could be the cost of holding money,
but which cost, the nominal or the real rate of interest? The
opportunity cost of holding money in noninterest-bearing liquid
form is the nominal rate of interest it could earn in an interest-
bearing form. So if the nominal rate of interest were up, money
would be more expensive to hold, and firms and households could be
expected to try to hold less of it by making it circulate more
rapidly. Will they?
Figure 6 measures the velocity of money as the ratio between
net national product and the money supply Ml-B. The latter, in turn,
is defined as currency plus demand deposits plus other checkable
deposits at banks and thrift institutions. Figure 6 plots the
velocity of money thus measured as a function of the nominal rate
of interest represented by the corporate bond yield.
There is a visible tendency for years having a high nominal
rate of interest to induce a velocity of money higher than that
induced by years having a low nominal rate of interest. But no more
than a tendency is visible. Like figure 1, figure 6 comes, as it
were, in three layers. This time they are 1965-1972, 1973-1976,
and 1977-1980. It has always been said that the velocity of money
is a matter of habits of payments, and perhaps it takes shocks to
change habits
.
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7. Conclusion
With a minimum of technique we have arranged pairwise twelve
key macroeconomic variables and drawn scatter diagrams of six macro-
economic functions, i.e., a Phillips function, a two-rates-of-interest
function, an investment function, a consumption function, a tax-
revenue function, and a velocity-of-money function.
The scatters form beams of widely differing width. But even
the narrowest beams, those of the consumption and tax-revenue
functions, show the powerful impact of the food and oil shocks.
-16-
REFERENCE
E. Brems, Inflation, Interest, and Growth, a Synthesis
,
Lexington,
Massachusetts, and Toronto, 1980.
M/D/359





HECKMAN
SINDERy INC.
JUN95

